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Death Penalty
by Josh D. Moore*
The Georgia Supreme Court addressed numerous cases touching on
the death penalty in our survey period,' including the review of four
death sentences on direct appeal in Ellington v. State,2 Rice v. State,
Barrett v. State,4 and Brockman v. State.' Three of the death sentences
reviewed on direct appeal were affirmed and one was reversed. The
court also reversed the decision of a habeas court to vacate a death
sentence in Humphrey v. Riley.' Several other cases involving the death
penalty at various stages of trial were also decided and will be addressed
further as warranted.' Most of the court's decisions involved the
application and refinement of existing precedent, but the court did
provide some significant new guidance regarding the proper scope ofjury
selection in death penalty trials, holding that the questioning of
prospective jurors for sentencing bias cannot be limited to the formal

* Appellate Director, Capital Defender Division of the Georgia Public Defender
Standards Council. University of Michigan (A.B., 1991); Harvard Law School (J.D., 1995).
The Author would like to thank Belle-Anne Bowen (Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law, 2014 J.D. candidate) for her invaluable research assistance.
1. For an analysis of Georgia death penalty law during the prior survey period, see
Josh D. Moore, Death Penalty, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 64 MERCER L. REV. 109
(2012).

2. 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012).
3. 292 Ga. 191, 735 S.E.2d 755 (2012).
4. 292 Ga. 160, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012).
5. 292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013).
6. 291 Ga. 534, 731 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
7. In addition to the cases discussed herein, one death penalty case reached the Georgia
Supreme Court from the denial of an extraordinary motion for a new trial. Dranev. State,
291 Ga. 298, 728 S.E.2d 679 (2012). In Drane, the defendant moved for a new trial eighteen
years after his conviction based upon his co-defendant's 2010 confession to a parole officer.
The court affirmed the denial of the motion based upon its conclusion that Drane had not
exercised due diligence in obtaining the co-defendant's testimony, having "shown absolutely
nothing to demonstrate that he took diligent steps to ascertain what testimony [the codefendant] might have been willing to give during the more than [seventeen] years since
[the co-defendant's] trial." Id. at 304, 728 S.E.2d at 683 (emphasis in original).
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allegations within an indictment but rather should be broad enough to
reach any "critical fact" of the case.
I.

CASE-SPECIFIC VoiR DIRE

The proper scope of voir dire in a death penalty trial has been the
subject of considerable dispute over the years, generating at least some
discussion in no fewer than seventy-six opinions from the Georgia
Supreme Court since the 1970s.s In Ellington v. State,9 the court

8. Brockman v. State, 292 Ga. 707, 717, 739 S.E.2d 332,345 (2013); Ellington v. State,
292 Ga. 109, 121, 735 S.E.2d 736, 750 (2012); Leonard v. State, 292 Ga. 214, 216, 735
S.E.2d 767, 771 (2012); Rice v. State, 292 Ga. 191, 195, 733 S.E.2d 755, 762 (2012); Bryant
v. State, 288 Ga. 876, 880-81, 708 S.E.2d 362, 371(2011); Ledford v. State, 289 Ga. 70, 7576, 709 S.E.2d 239, 248 (2011); Herrera v. State, 288 Ga. 231, 235, 702 S.E.2d 854, 858
(2010); Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 846, 691 S.E.2d 854, 866 (2010); Arrington v. State,
286 Ga. 335, 338, 687 S.E.2d 438, 446 (2009); O'Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 761, 670
S.E.2d 388, 393 (2008); Wagner v. State, 282 Ga. 149, 151, 646 S.E.2d 676, 679 (2007);
Buttram v. State, 280 Ga. 595, 596, 631 S.E.2d 642, 645 (2006); Lewis v. State, 279 Ga.
756, 759, 620 S.E.2d 778, 783 (2005); Riley v. State, 278 Ga. 677, 684, 604 S.E.2d 488, 496
(2004); Sealey v. State, 277 Ga. 617, 619, 593 S.E.2d 335, 338 (2004); Laster v. State, 276
Ga. 645, 647, 581 S.E.2d 522, 525 (2003); Lawler v. State, 276 Ga. 229, 235, 576 S.E.2d
841, 848 (2003); Salie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 509, 578 S.E.2d 444, 450 (2003); Spickler v.
State, 276 Ga. 164, 165, 575 S.E.2d 482, 485 (2003); Braley v. State, 276 Ga. 47, 51, 572
S.E.2d 583, 591 (2002); Brannan v. State, 275 Ga. 70, 75, 561 S.E.2d 414,422 (2002); Lance
v. State, 275 Ga. 11, 15, 560 S.E.2d 663, 671 (2002); Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 38, 572
S.E.2d 595, 600 (2002); Fults v. State, 274 Ga. 82, 85, 548 S.E.2d 315, 320 (2001); Lucas
v. State, 274 Ga. 640, 645-46, 555 S.E.2d 440, 446-47 (2001); Presnell v. State, 274 Ga. 246,
248-49, 551 S.E.2d 723, 729 (2001); Rhode v. State, 274 Ga. 377, 379, 552 S.E.2d 855, 859
(2001); Gissendaner v. State, 272 Ga. 704, 707, 532 S.E.2d 677, 684 (2000); King v. State,
273 Ga. 258, 262, 539 S.E.2d 783, 791 (2000); Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 695, 532
S.E.2d 78, 84 (2000); Nance v. State, 272 Ga. 217, 222, 526 S.E.2d 560, 566 (2000); Zellmer
v. State, 272 Ga. 735, 735, 534 S.E.2d 802, 803 (2000); Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780,
783, 514 S.E.2d 205, 210 (1999); Johnson v. State, 271 Ga. 375, 380-81, 519 S.E.2d 221, 228
(1999); Pace v. State, 271 Ga. 829, 833-34, 524 S.E.2d 490, 499 (1999); Pruitt v. State, 270
Ga. 745, 750, 514 S.E.2d 639, 646 (1999); Barnes v. State, 269 Ga. 345, 351, 496 S.E.2d
674, 683 (1998); Jenkins v. State, 269 Ga. 282, 287, 498 S.E.2d 502, 509 (1998); Bishop v.
State, 268 Ga. 286, 289, 486 S.E.2d 887, 893 (1997); Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 547, 553, 480
S.E.2d 583, 590 (1997); Greene v. State, 268 Ga. 47, 47, 485 S.E.2d 741, 742 (1997);
Raulerson v. State, 268 Ga. 623, 629,491 S.E.2d 791, 799 (1997); Turner v. State, 268 Ga.
213, 217, 486 S.E.2d 839, 843 (1997); Waldrip v. State, 267 Ga. 739, 743, 482 S.E.2d 299,
307 (1997); Drane v. State, 265 Ga. 255,260,455 S.E.2d 27,33 (1995); Mobley v. State, 265
Ga. 292, 295, 455 S.E.2d 61, 67 (1995); Burgess v. State, 264 Ga. 777, 780, 450 S.E.2d 680,
688 (1994); Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 904, 906-07, 440 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1994); Walker v.
State, 262 Ga. 694, 695, 424 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1993); Bennett v. State, 262 Ga. 149, 151, 414
S.E.2d 218, 221 (1992); Hall v. State, 259 Ga. 412, 414, 383 S.E.2d 128, 130 (1989); Isaacs
v. State, 259 Ga. 717, 730, 386 S.E.2d 316, 328 (1989); Miller v. State, 259 Ga. 296, 297,
380 S.E.2d 690, 692 (1989); Potts v. State, 259 Ga. 96, 101, 376 S.E.2d 851, 856 (1989);
Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43,43,365 S.E.2d 265,267 (1988); Skipper v. State, 257 Ga.
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addressed yet another serious controversy over the proper boundaries of
capital voir dire. Ellington was convicted and sentenced to death in
2008 for murdering his wife and their twin two-year-old sons with a
hammer.10 Prior to jury selection, Ellington had insisted on his right
to question potential jurors about their biases resulting from the fact
that two of the victims were young children.n The prosecution
"strongly objected," and, after having indicted Ellington in a manner not
revealing this fact to potential jurors, managed to secure a ruling from
the Superior Court of DeKalb County that precluded the defense counsel
from mentioning "that two of these deceased people are children in voir

dire."12

Observing near the outset that "[miuch like cross-examination is the
engine of truth in our justice system, voir dire is the engine of selecting
a jury that will be fair and impartial,"" the supreme court concluded
that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Ellington from
informing potential jurors that the case involved children, particularly
in the context of questioning the jurors about the various sentencing
options.' In reaching this conclusion, the court provided some muchneeded guidance to lawyers and judges regarding the proper scope of
section 15-12-133 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)"
and the parameters of a defendant's constitutional right to adequate voir
dire, especially in the context of a death penalty trial." The court

802, 806, 364 S.E.2d 835, 839 (1988); Childs v. State, 257 Ga. 243, 249, 357 S.E.2d 48, 55
(1987); Ford v. State, 257 Ga. 461, 464, 360 S.E.2d 258, 261 (1987); Legare v. State, 256
Ga. 302, 303, 348 S.E.2d 881, 881-82 (1986); Alderman v. State, 254 Ga. 206, 206, 327
S.E.2d 168, 171(1985); Curry v. State, 255 Ga. 215,218,336 S.E.2d 762,766 (1985); Devier
v. State, 253 Ga. 604, 606, 323 S.E.2d 150, 154 (1984); Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 631,
323 S.E.2d 801, 811 (1984); Roberts v. State, 252 Ga. 227, 231, 314 S.E.2d 83, 90 (1984);
Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 193, 319 S.E.2d 420, 428-29 (1984); Castell v. State, 250 Ga.
776, 784, 301 S.E.2d 234, 243 (1983); Henderson v. State, 251 Ga. 398, 400, 306 S.E.2d 645,
647 (1983); Padgett v. State, 251 Ga. 503, 504, 307 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1983); Mathis v. State,
249 Ga. 454, 455, 291 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1982); Godfrey v. State, 248 Ga. 616, 621, 284
S.E.2d 422, 427 (1981); Messer v. State, 247 Ga. 316, 323, 276 S.E.2d 15, 22 (1981); Waters
v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 362, 283 S.E.2d 238, 246 (1981); Cobb v. State, 244 Ga. 344, 349, 260
S.E.2d 60, 66 (1979); Lamb v. State, 241 Ga. 10, 12, 243 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1978); Whitlock v.
State, 230 Ga. 700, 705-06, 198 S.E.2d 865, 868 (1973); Curtis v. State, 224 Ga. 870, 87071, 165 S.E.2d 150, 152 (1968).
9. 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736 (2012).
10. Id. at 109-10, 123, 144, 735 S.E.2d at 743, 752, 765.
11. Id. at 121, 735 S.E.2d at 750.
12. Id. at 121, 735 S.E.2d at 750-51.
13. Id. at 124, 735 S.E.2d at 752.
14. Id. at 131, 735 S.E.2d at 757.
15. O.C.G.A. § 15-12-133 (2012).
16. See generally Ellington, 292 Ga. 109, 735 S.E.2d 736.
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announced that both parties have an absolute right to question potential
jurors regarding any
"critical facts" of the case that experience, reason, and common sense
indicate will be so influential for at least some prospective jurors that
they will be unable to consider all of the evidence in the case in light
of the court's instructions on the law and render a fair and impartial
verdict."
The court clarified further by explaining that such questions "must ...
be based only on critical facts that are likely to be proved at trial or will
genuinely be in dispute."" The court expressed little doubt that the
age of Ellington's victims constituted such a critical fact. 9
The court noted three limitations on its holding on case-specific voir
dire.20 First, the court pointed out that jurors who merely express that
the critical fact at issue would "be very important or worthy of great
weight"2 ' will not be automatically disqualified from service.22 Second, the court warned that the inquiry must be properly formulated and
must not "seek to commit the juror to voting a certain way based on that
fact." 23 In this regard, the court offered the following suggestions:
"Would you automatically reject a life sentence if the evidence showed
x?" and "Could you fairly consider a death sentence if the evidence
showed x?"24 Third, the court offered a reminder that trial courts
generally retain broad discretion when it comes to voir dire, and that a
decision about which facts are critical enough to warrant specific inquiry
will "be given significant deference in appellate review."2'
This opinion is likely to have a significant impact on jury selection in
death penalty cases and will increase fairness in the process for both
sides, ensuring that the jurors who are seated in a death penalty trial
will be qualified to perform their duties without disqualifying attitudes. 26

17. Id. at 135-36, 733 S.E.2d at 760.
18. Id. at 137, 733 S.E.2d at 760.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 136, 733 S.E.2d at 760.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 137, 733 S.E.2d at 760.
25. Id. at 137, 733 S.E.2d at 761. The court also suggested, in a footnote, that the
question of whether a particular fact of the case is critical enough to warrant inquiry on
voir dire would be an appropriate subject for interim, or even interlocutory, review in close
cases. Id. at 137 n.8, 733 S.E.2d at 761 n.8.
26. The court observed in this regard that "our resolution of this issue should not be
perceived as helpful in general to either party in criminal cases, including death penalty
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INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Three significant death penalty cases reached the court on issues of
ineffective assistance of counsel. In Barrett v. State27 and Rice v.
State," the court rejected claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised on direct appeal," and in Humphrey v. Riley,"o the court
reversed a state habeas court's decision to vacate a death sentence on
the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing
phase.a"
Barrett and Rice both contended broadly that their lawyers failed to
provide them with effective assistance of counsel at either stage of their
trials.32 Although the majority of their complaints related to issues
that were not specific to the death penalty, the analysis of their
sentencing phase claims was noteworthy for the court's approach to
evaluating ineffectiveness in situations where defendants are bent on
obstructing their lawyers' efforts to develop and present mitigation
evidence."
The court cited to the American Bar Association (ABA) Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases3 ' in both Rice and Barrett as a useful benchmark for assessing
counsel's performance, holding in Barrettthat "the relevant guideline in
effect at the time of Barrett's trial [2005] stated that the sentencing
phase investigation 'should be conducted regardless of any statement by
the client that evidence bearing upon penalty is not . .. to be collected

or presented."'"s

cases," as prosecutors also may uncover disqualifying biases that would otherwise work to
their disadvantage, such as where the victims "may be less sympathetic." Id. at 133, 733
S.E.2d at 758.
27. 292 Ga. 160, 733 S.E.2d 304 (2012).
28. 292 Ga. 191, 733 S.E.2d 755 (2012).
29. Barrett,292 Ga. at 174, 733 S.E.2d at 317; Rice, 292 Ga. at 211, 733 S.E.2d at 773.
30. 291 Ga. 534, 731 S.E.2d 740 (2012).
31. Riley, 291 Ga. at 535, 731 S.E.2d at 742.
32. Barrett,292 Ga. at 173, 733 S.E.2d at 316; Rice, 292 Ga. at 204, 733 S.E.2d at 768.
33. Rice was described as "stubbornly uncooperative with a series of attorneys and . . .
generally opposed to the preparation of mitigating evidence," 292 Ga. at 205, 733 S.E.2d
at 769, and Barrett "was adamant that no mitigation evidence be presented" and "refused
to assist counsel in locating mitigation witnesses." 292 Ga. at 185, 733 S.E.2d at 323.
34. Am. Bar Ass'n, ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performanceof Defense
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913 (2003) [hereinafter
ABA 2003 Guidelines].
35. Barrett, 292 Ga. at 185, 733 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting ABA 2003 Guidelines, supra
note 34, at 1015).
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The language cited by the court in Barrett continues to be the
prevailing norm as to defense counsel's responsibilities in cases where
clients obstruct, or attempt to obstruct, mitigation investigation.6 It
should, however, be noted that since Barrett's trial, the ABA has

released its Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of
Defense Teams in Death Penalty Cases, further elaborating on the proper
standard of care on the part of defense counsel in these complicated
situations."
Although the court cited to Strickland v. Washington" for a characterization of the ABA Guidelines as "only guides,"" it seemed nonetheless to accept the proposition that proceeding with a mitigation
investigation over a defendant's objections is now the appropriate
professional standard of care in a death penalty case.40 As such, the
court elected to approach this issue, at least with respect to Barrett,'
"assuming arguendo" that trial counsel's mitigation investigation was
deficient."'
Quoting from its recent opinion in Perkins v. Hall,4 however, the
court in Barrett reaffirmed that "reasonable attorney performance
includes investigating mitigating evidence to the extent feasible given
the defendant's willingness to cooperate and then, if the defendant
insists, following his instructions regarding the ultimate defense to
pursue.'" In view of this holding, Barrett's claim of prejudice essentially rested on the argument that "perhaps [trial counsel] could have
persuaded" Barrett to allow them to present a mitigation case had they
"conducted a reasonable investigation."
This argument proved too
speculative for the court, which observed that Barrett produced "no

36.

Id.

37. Am. Bar Ass'n, Supplementary Guidelines for the Mitigation Function of Defense
Teams in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted in 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677 (2008) [hereinafter
ABA 2008 Supplementary Guidelines].
38. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
39. Barrett,292 Ga. at 185-86, 733 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)).
40. Id. at 185-86, 733 S.E.2d at 324.
41. Although there was no measureable discrepancy in the court's approach to these
two cases, the Barrettopinion does treat this issue in somewhat greater detail-probably
owing to a more compelling presentation of mitigation evidence at the motion for new
trial-and so will be the focus of the remainder of the discussion here. CompareRice, 292
Ga. at 204-08, 733 S.E.2d at 768-70, with Barrett, 292 Ga. at 184-90, 733 S.E.2d at 323-26.
42. Barrett, 292 Ga. at 186, 733 S.E.2d at 324.
43. 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335 (2011).
44. Barrett, 292 Ga. at 185, 733 S.E.2d at 324 (quoting Perkins v. Hall, 288 Ga. 810,
815, 708 S.E.2d 335, 341 (2011)).
45. Id. at 186, 733 S.E.2d at 324.
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evidence" suggesting that he would have changed his mind and
permitted the evidence to be used-at least with respect to the testimony
of his family members.'
In both Barrett and Rice, the court gravitated strongly towards the
prejudice prong of its Strickland analysis, assuming deficiencies in both
cases but concluding that they did "not in reasonable probability [affect]
the outcome of . .. trial."47

In Humphrey v. Riley, the court systematically broke down Riley's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim into separate categories of
evidence and proceeded to dismiss the significance of each, ultimately
determining "that the habeas court erred by concluding that there is a
reasonable probability that Riley's trial counsel's deficiencies changed
the outcome of his trial and, therefore, erred by granting relief . ..
The preponderance of Riley's claims involved mental health and arson
experts that trial counsel either failed to develop or failed to call."
Although the court did cite to certain areas where it either found or
assumed deficiencies, it concluded that any prejudice that Riley suffered,
"considering the combined effect of counsel's actual and assumed
deficiencies," was insufficient to support the habeas court's order
granting reliefo
The court's treatment of these ineffective assistance claims reveals a
decided preference for finding or assuming deficiencies in performance
and focusing instead on the presence or absence of outcome-determinative prejudice. Riley, especially when read in conjunction with other
recent habeas corpus cases,' seems also to reflect a decided disinclination to extend much deference to the findings and conclusions of habeas
courts in the death penalty context." This trend would seem to be
especially acute in the area of ineffective assistance-of-counsel claims.

46. Id. at 187, 733 S.E.2d at 325.
47. Barrett, 292 Ga. at 189, 733 S.E.2d at 326; see also Rice, 292 Ga. at 211, 733 S.E.2d
at 773.
48. Riley, 291 Ga. at 537, 731 S.E.2d at 744.
49. Id. at 538-42, 731 S.E.2d at 744-47.
50. Id. at 545, 731 S.E.2d at 749.
51. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Nance, 293 Ga. 189, 744 S.E.2d 706 (2013); Humphrey v.
Lewis, 291 Ga. 202, 728 S.E.2d 603 (2012); Perkins, 288 Ga. 810, 708 S.E.2d 335.
52. The court's proper role in these situations is to "accept the habeas court's findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but [to] apply the facts to the law de novo." Riley,
291 Ga. at 537, 731 S.E.2d at 743. Although never specifically articulated in these cases,
it appears that the court regards the question of whether or not there is a reasonable
probability that deficiencies in representation would have led to a different result as
something other than a finding of fact.
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III. THE "(BX2)" STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(b)(2)" authorizes the death penalty in any case
where the capital offense was committed "while the offender was
engaged in the commission of another capital felony or aggravated
battery, or the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of burglary in any degree or arson in the first
degree."54 In Brockman v. State,s" the defendant was convicted of
felony murder and criminal attempt to commit armed robbery in
connection with a botched robbery attempt at a Muscogee County gas
station in 1990.6 Brockman was sentenced to death the next day
based upon the jury's (bX2) finding that the murder was committed
while Brockman was engaged in the commission of an armed robbery."
Brockman challenged this finding and his death sentence on the
ground that "no evidence was presented that Brockman took anything
during the incident," and, as such, that the technical elements of armed
robbery were not met." The court rejected this argument because the
statute "does not require that the other felony be completed .

.

. [nlor

does the statute require that the defendant be charged with or convicted
of the other felony."" The court reiterated its conclusion from previous
cases that the (b)(2) circumstance presents a question of fact for the jury
whether "the murder was committed 'while the offender was engaged in
the commission of' the other felony," and that this question is separate
and distinct from the question of whether the defendant is guilty of the
other felony.6 o The court also summarily rejected Brockman's argument that this construction of the (b)(2) circumstance would expand it
to the extent that it could no longer serve its constitutionally mandated
purpose "to limit the situations in which the death penalty can be sought
and . . . to channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective

standards."6 1

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(bX2) (2013).
Id.
292 Ga. 707, 739 S.E.2d 332 (2013).
Id. at 707-08, 739 S.E.2d at 339-40.
See id. at 707, 739 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 710-11, 739 S.E.2d at 341.
Id. at 711, 739 S.E.2d at 341 (internal citation omitted).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30 (b)(2)).
Id. at 712, 739 S.E.2d at 342.
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THE "(BX7)" STATUTORY AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE

In Ellington, the court also addressed a prevalent instructional error
made in connection with O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(bX7). 62 The court stated,
"As in several prior cases, the jury's sentencing verdict ... referred to
'torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim.'" 63
Since Georgia law requires a unanimous finding beyond a reasonable
doubt as to all statutory aggravating circumstances, this disjunctive
verdict form was found to be improper because it allowed for the
possibility that Ellington's jurors may not have "agreed unanimously on
any one of the three subparts.'
V.

PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW

Both Barrett and Brockman made substantial efforts on direct appeal
to demonstrate that their death sentences were disproportionate and
arbitrary in comparison to the sentences imposed in similar cases."
The court considered these arguments pursuant to its mandatory review
under O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(1) and (3)."
Barrett was convicted and sentenced to death for killing his close
friend during the course of a drunken brawl that led to a shooting at
Barrett's home in Towns County.6 7 "Relying on [seventeen] cases that
he claim[ed] [were] similar to his own in which the defendant[s] did not
receive a death sentence, Barrett allege [d] that his death sentence [was]
disproportionate to [the] sentences imposed in similar cases."
The
court focused on the brutality of Barrett's assault to justify his death
sentence, as well as the fact that Barrett himself appeared uninjured."
In support of its conclusion, the court cited to numerous, prior death
penalty cases involving an aggravated battery or (bX7) aggravating
circumstance, several of which "also include [d] evidence that the victim
had engaged in some provocative behavior."o

62.
63.
64.
65.
S.E.2d
66.
S.E.2d
67.
68.
69.
70.

O.C.G.A. § 17-10-30(bX7) (2013).
Ellington, 292 Ga. at 146, 735 S.E.2d at 766 (emphasis added by the court).
Id.
See Brockman, 292 Ga. at 738, 739 S.E.2d at 359; Barrett, 292 Ga. at 189, 733
at 326.
See Brockman, 292 Ga. at 740, 739 S.E.2d at 360; Barrett, 292 Ga. at 190, 733
at 327; see also O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(1), (3) (2013).
See Barrett, 292 Ga. at 160-61, 733 S.E.2d at 307-08.
Id. at 189, 733 S.E.2d at 326.
Id. at 189-90, 733 S.E.2d at 326-27.
Id. at 190, 733 S.E.2d at 327.

102

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

Brockman was convicted and sentenced to death for the botched armed
robbery of a Muscogee County gas station, where Brockman pointed a
gun at the manager from inside a car and demanded money." The
evidence at trial showed that, after a brief verbal exchange, Brockman
shot the manager a single time "inthe abdomen" with a .38 revolver and
then drove away without getting any money." On appeal, Brockman
contended that "there is only one reported decision by this [c] ourt
affirming the death sentence where the only statutory aggravating
circumstance was the (b)(2) circumstance [of] armed robbery and the
evidence showed that the defendant did not actually complete the armed
robbery."73
The prior reported decision that Brockman referred to was Amadeo v.
State," and Brockman "point[ed] out that the death sentence in that
case was subsequently reversed on federal habeas review." The court,
however, dismissed as irrelevant the fact that the sentence in Amadeo
had been reversed on federal habeas review, observing that the reversal
was "for reasons unrelated to the juries' reactions to the evidence."
In addition to the claim that only one prior reported decision had
affirmed a death sentence under similar circumstances, "Brockman also
contend[ed] that juries in a number of recently tried cases involving
murder and armed robbery with facts more egregious than those present
in his case were not asked to return a death sentence."77 The court
ultimately looked to the circumstances surrounding Brockman's crime
to support the death sentence, noting that Brockman "had participated
in two burglaries and four completed armed robberies before the
attempted armed robbery and murder" in this case, "had pointed a
loaded gun at three robbery victims and demanded their money," and
"was free on bond on charges stemming from one of these crimes at the
time of this incident. " The court also noted Brockman's conduct
following the murder, characterizing it as "bragg[ing].""
The treatment of these proportionality arguments reveals that the
court continues to be largely unimpressed by citation to comparison
cases that did not result in a death sentence, and the court continues to

71. Brockman, 292 Ga. at 707-09, 739 S.E.2d at 339-40.
72. Id. at 709, 739 S.E.2d at 340.
73. Id. at 738, 739 S.E.2d at 359.
74. 243 Ga. 627, 255 S.E.2d 718 (1979).
75. Brockman, 292 Ga. at 738, 739 S.E.2d at 359.
76. Id. at 739, 739 S.E.2d at 359 (quoting Davis v. Turpin, 273 Ga. 244, 246, 539 S.E.2d
129, 131 (2000)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 739, 739 S.E.2d at 359-60.
79. Id. at 739, 739 S.E.2d at 360.
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be untroubled by the subsequent reversal of the death sentences it relies
on so long as those reversals are "for reasons unrelated to the juries'
reactions to the evidence."o Although both proportionality claims were
disposed of in relatively short order,a" the court's detailed treatment of
them reflects a concern about this issue in general. Specific reference to
Brockman's crime spree and braggadocio,82 as well as a graphic
discussion of the gruesome injuries suffered by Barrett's victim," give
rise to an inference that the court could have reached a different
conclusion in the absence of these significant factors.
VI.

JURY PooL LITGATION

In Ellington, the court addressed a jury pool challenge alleging underrepresentation of certain groups." The court once again sanctioned the
approach of "forced balancing" a jury list," but observed in a footnote
that the Jury Composition Reform Act of 201186 has now "replaced the
forced balancing approach with a new system for creating grand and
traverse jury pools," signaling that jury pool litigation going forward
will take place on an entirely new footing."
Two other aspects of the court's treatment of Ellington's jury pool
composition claims bear brief mention. First, the supreme court
explicitly disapproved of the superior court's conclusion that Georgia's
Unified Appeal Procedure 's five percentage point under-representation
limit is merely a "prophylactic rule and [an] aspirational goal," but noted
that the court's "authority to remedy this issue is unsettled."" Second,

80. Id. at 739-40, 739 S.E.2d at 359-60 (quoting Davis, 273 Ga. at 246, 539 S.E.2d at
131).
81. See id. at 738-40, 739 S.E.2d at 359-60; Barrett, 292 Ga. at 189-90, 733 S.E.2d at
326-27.
82. Brockman, 292 Ga. at 739, 739 S.E.2d at 359-60.
83. Barrett, 292 Ga. at 162, 733 S.E.2d at 309.
84. Ellington, 292 Ga. at 118, 735 S.E.2d at 748-49.
85. Forced balancing is a method of selecting jurors that requires that the jury pool
reflect a certain identifiable demographics mix based on the most recent decennial census.
Id. at 117-18, 735 S.E.2d at 748.
86. Ga. H.R. Bill 415, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 59 (codified in scattered sections of
O.C.G.A. tits. 15, 16, 21, 40, 45, and 50 (Supp. 2013)).
87. Ellington, 292 Ga. at 118 n.2, 735 S.E.2d at 748 n.2.
88. The new method for compiling jury lists in Georgia is as yet untested in the
appellate courts but generally involves creating a much more inclusive list that "should be
no less than 85% inclusive of the number of persons in the county population age (eighteen]
years or older." See GEORGIA SUPREME COURT, JURY COMPOSITION RULE, available at
http*//ww.gasupreme.us/rules/JURY%20COMPOSITION%20RULE%20-%2007_01_13.pdf.
89. Ellington, 292 Ga. at 119-20, 735 S.E.2d at 749-50 (alteration in original) (quoting
unreported trial court order).
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the court described evidence that Ellington's grand jury list "included no
persons under the age of [twenty]" as "anomalous," but ultimately held
that no constitutional violation had occurred because Ellington failed to
establish that "persons under [twenty] years old were a cognizable group
in DeKalb County."o
VII. SPEEDY TRIAL
The court addressed two speedy trial claims on opposite ends of the
spectrum in the context of death penalty prosecutions. In State v.
Buckner," the supreme court affirmed the Superior Court of Chatham
County's dismissal of a murder case on constitutional speedy trial
grounds.92 Also, in Sosniak v. State," the court resoundingly affirmed
the Superior Court of Forsyth County's denial of a speedy trial motion
for dismissal and, at the same time, overruled prior supreme court
precedent guaranteeing defendants the right to pre-trial review of
adverse rulings on speedy trial motions.94
Buckner's case had been pending in the trial court for just over fourand-a-half years at the time he filed his original motion to dismiss,"
while Sosniak's case had been pending for more than five years."
However, the similarities end there. The most salient factors in the
court's analysis of these two claims were the finding of actual prejudice
suffered by Buckner because of the delay" and the finding that
Sosniak, on the other hand, had moved for numerous continuances, one
of which had been denied only shortly before the speedy trial motion at
issue was filed."
The court's Barker v. Wingo" analysis in both cases ran along
familiar lines, with two exceptions of note. As mentioned above, the
court took the opportunity presented by Sosniak to reverse course on the
question of whether "a defendant has the right to bring a direct appeal
from a denial of a pre-trial motion for a constitutional speedy trial,"o
ultimately concluding that the cases authorizing such appeals were

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 120, 735 S.E.2d at 750.
292 Ga. 390, 738 S.E.2d 65 (2013).
Id. at 391, 738 S.E.2d at 69.
292 Ga. 35, 734 S.E.2d 362 (2012).
Id. at 35, 40, 734 S.E.2d at 364, 368.
Buckner, 292 Ga. at 393, 738 S.E.2d at 69.
Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 41, 734 S.E.2d at 368.
Buckner, 292 Ga. at 393-94, 738 S.E.2d at 70.
Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 36, 734 S.E.2d at 365.
407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Sosniak, 292 Ga. at 40, 734 S.E.2d 367-68.
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wrongly decided."o' A stern concurring opinion by Justice Nahmias
characterized Sosniak's motion as "entirely meritless" and intimated that
many, if not most, pre-trial appeals of speedy trial motions have been
deliberate tactical manipulations of the law by defendants seeking to
achieve even further delays.102
The most noteworthy aspect of the court's decision in Buckner, at least
as it pertains to the death penalty, was its endorsement of the superior
court's conclusion that the ten-month period of delay attributed to the
late filing-and subsequent withdrawal--of a notice of intent to seek the
death penalty should be weighed "more heavily" against the State, since
it "was the result of a deliberate decision by the State and something
more than mere negligence."'o The superior court had characterized
this period of delay as "altogether unnecessary" and criticized the State
for making its decision to seek the death penalty only after the case "had
already been outstanding for forty months."'04
In sharp contrast to the trend discussed above with respect to the
character of deference granted to habeas courts' findings on the question
of ineffective assistance of counsel, this court continues to appear willing
to extend significant deference to trial courts' determinations on the
question of whether a defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The most significant development in the area of death penalty
jurisprudence over this past year was undoubtedly the court's clarification of the proper scope of "death qualification" voir dire under Georgia
law, but the court also offered important further guidance on counsel's
proper role in cases where clients obstruct mitigation investigation, and
reaffirmed its interpretation of certain aspects of the (b)(2) and (b)(7)
statutory aggravating circumstances that have generated confusion in
the trial courts. The court also finds itself dealing with increasingly
sophisticated and nuanced arguments on proportionality-possibly
percolating up in response to Justice Stevens's recent criticism of the
court's proportionality review in his statement respecting the denial of
certiorari in Walker v. Georgia.05

101. Id.
102. Id. at 44, 734 S.E.2d at 370 (Nahmias, J., concurring) ("No longer will defendants
in Georgia be able to invoke the right to a speedy trial to achieve exactly the opposite of
the constitutional guarantee-lengthy and unnecessary delays in criminal trials.").
103. Buckner, 292 Ga. at 394-95, 738 S.E.2d at 71 (quoting unreported trial court
order).
104. Id. (quoting unreported trial court order).
105. 555 U.S. 979, 982 (2008).
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